diff options
| author | Felipe Leme <felipeal@google.com> | 2017-08-02 15:52:05 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Android (Google) Code Review <android-gerrit@google.com> | 2017-08-02 15:52:05 +0000 |
| commit | c8f0fd7076233fa969ccc523fc5284d50b2c759a (patch) | |
| tree | e422cb397a98c6326f08e016a7cc2294200a92fd /core/java | |
| parent | 6829a1dace16c05f3af362b62c15b6ce5f4399fa (diff) | |
| parent | 2fb64c0b2824c2df00b27f6702fa0030c6e1e71e (diff) | |
Merge "Clarifies how the autofill service should check for signature hashes." into oc-dev
Diffstat (limited to 'core/java')
| -rw-r--r-- | core/java/android/service/autofill/AutofillService.java | 43 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/core/java/android/service/autofill/AutofillService.java b/core/java/android/service/autofill/AutofillService.java index a80ef032e68f..c068e6a21db6 100644 --- a/core/java/android/service/autofill/AutofillService.java +++ b/core/java/android/service/autofill/AutofillService.java @@ -179,11 +179,18 @@ import com.android.internal.os.SomeArgs; * should not contain fields for username, password, and credit card information. The reason for * this rule is that a malicious app could draft a view structure where the credit card fields * are not visible, so when the user selects a dataset from the username UI, the credit card info is - * released to the application without the user knowledge. Similar, it's recommended to always + * released to the application without the user knowledge. Similarly, it's recommended to always * protect a dataset that contains sensitive information by requiring dataset authentication - * (see {@link Dataset.Builder#setAuthentication(android.content.IntentSender)}). + * (see {@link Dataset.Builder#setAuthentication(android.content.IntentSender)}), and to include + * info about the "primary" field of the partition in the custom presentation for "secondary" + * fields — that would prevent a malicious app from getting the "primary" fields without the + * user realizing they're being released (for example, a malicious app could have fields for a + * credit card number, verification code, and expiration date crafted in a way that just the latter + * is visible; by explicitly indicating the expiration date is related to a given credit card + * number, the service would be providing a visual clue for the users to check what would be + * released upon selecting that field). * - * <p>When the service detects that a screen have multiple partitions, it should return a + * <p>When the service detects that a screen has multiple partitions, it should return a * {@link FillResponse} with just the datasets for the partition that originated the request (i.e., * the partition that has the {@link android.app.assist.AssistStructure.ViewNode} whose * {@link android.app.assist.AssistStructure.ViewNode#isFocused()} returns {@code true}); then if @@ -236,6 +243,36 @@ import com.android.internal.os.SomeArgs; * <p>When the service returns multiple {@link FillResponse}, the last one overrides the previous; * that's why the {@link SaveInfo} in the 2nd request above has the info for both partitions. * + * <h3>Package verification</h3> + * + * <p>When autofilling app-specific data (like username and password), the service must verify + * the authenticity of the request by obtaining all signing certificates of the app being + * autofilled, and only fulfilling the request when they match the values that were + * obtained when the data was first saved — such verification is necessary to avoid phishing + * attempts by apps that were sideloaded in the device with the same package name of another app. + * Here's an example on how to achieve that by hashing the signing certificates: + * + * <pre class="prettyprint"> + * private String getCertificatesHash(String packageName) throws Exception { + * PackageManager pm = mContext.getPackageManager(); + * PackageInfo info = pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET_SIGNATURES); + * ArrayList<String> hashes = new ArrayList<>(info.signatures.length); + * for (Signature sig : info.signatures) { + * byte[] cert = sig.toByteArray(); + * MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256"); + * md.update(cert); + * hashes.add(toHexString(md.digest())); + * } + * Collections.sort(hashes); + * StringBuilder hash = new StringBuilder(); + * for (int i = 0; i < hashes.size(); i++) { + * hash.append(hashes.get(i)); + * } + * return hash.toString(); + * } + * + * </pre> + * * <h3>Ignoring views</h3> * * <p>If the service find views that cannot be autofilled (for example, a text field representing |
