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AttributionSource uses Binder.getCallingUid to verify the UID of the
caller from another process. However, getCallingUid does not always
behave as expected. If the AttributionSource is unparceled outside a
transaction thread, which is quite possible, getCallingUid will return
the UID of the current process instead. If this is a system process,
the UID check gets bypassed entirely, meaning any uid can be provided.
This patch fixes the vulnerability by emptying out the state of the
AttributionSource, so that the service checking its credentials will
fail to give permission to the app.
Bug: 267231571
Test: v2/android-virtual-infra/test_mapping/presubmit-avd
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5d79e535b9a802680062545e15fc1faaf779c0bf)
Merged-In: I3f228064fbd62e1c907f1ebe870cb61102f788f0
Change-Id: I3f228064fbd62e1c907f1ebe870cb61102f788f0
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Original change: https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/frameworks/base/+/16461958
Change-Id: Ibe87764f679863f20bac59ce237fbabeca29ce26
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Bug: 200288596
Test: Manual
Test: atest android.security.cts.AttributionSourceTest#testPidCheck
Change-Id: I07f86ba220bedb1393f4d7ed23175e92d4576601
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Modified myAttributionSource() to check for global AS for
process in ActivityThread and fallback to building new AS
with PackageManager#getPackageForUid(myUid()) if null.
Tag: #feature
Bug: 210467846
Bug: 210468546
Test: build
Change-Id: I7aa75395469bf0bb806100420faaf98c52057355
CTS-Coverage-Bug: 210906055
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Attribution source constructor are hidden api
Add a Builder option to take a AttributionSource as parameter
Test: atest BluetoothInstrumentationTests
Bug: 195144968
Tag: #refactor
Ignore-AOSP-First: No such thing on aosp
Change-Id: I901c8afff6a40bd8484fd8e10baf290aa483c280
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We trust any incoming value from the system UID, so we should also
trust values coming from the root UID, which includes many shell
commands such as "svc".
Bug: 193659633
Test: atest BluetoothInstrumentationTests:com.android.bluetooth.btservice.AdapterServiceTest --rerun-until-failure 100
Change-Id: Ied07731345f08fc3c4df465a3773e35c8df7c59a
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The Bluetooth stack is just one example of an application that makes
self-calls through public APIs, which makes it very difficult to
unconditionally validate AttributionSource arguments.
(The AttributionSource is correctly defined the first time a remote
caller enters the Bluetooth stack, but we've found many cases where
Bluetooth stack calls back into itself without clearing the Binder
identity, causing validation chaos.)
This change is an attempt at gracefully solving this by performing
validation automatically as part of unparceling an AttributionSource
the first time it enters a process. This strategy isn't perfect,
since transporting an instance inside a Bundle would risk
unparceling much later, possibly long after the calling UID
information has been discarded. We're rationalizing that this risk
doesn't exist since AttributionSource was only added a few months
ago, and isn't being used in this way.
We still intend to circle back and provide a better strategy in a
future release for transporting AttributionSource across AIDL which
will handle the nuances of self-calls.
Bug: 188391719
Test: atest BluetoothInstrumentationTests
Change-Id: I10b198cfcd8f361e19d52f86deb7f10f05fec891
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For cases where the attribution soruce doesn't need to be
registered as trusted we are now using a shares static
token since the only purpose of the token in these cases
is for watching the source process dying as opposed to that
and security for registered cases.
bug: 192415943
Test: CtsPermissionTestCases
CtsPermission2TestCases
CtsPermission3TestCases
CtsPermission4TestCases
CtsPermission5TestCases
Change-Id: I93fde9ca1cacada7929761533dcae11b2736ce1e
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We've seen evidence of a Binder leak, and our hunch is that it's
caused by one of these anonymous "new Binder()" sites. Adding
descriptors will help us identify the leak cause.
Bug: 192415943
Test: atest BluetoothInstrumentationTests
Change-Id: I30cd15f084cf50f67edd833b27b853c4b22e1db1
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Attribution source is the abstraction to capture the data
flows for private data across apps. Checking permissions
for an attribution source does this for all apps in the
chain that would receive the data as well as the relevant
app ops are checked/noted/started as needed.
Teach speech recognition service about attribution
chains. If an implementation does nothing the OS
would enforce permisisons and do blame as always.
This apporach leads to double blaming and doesn't
support attribition chains where app calls into
the default recognizer which calls into the on
device recognizer (this nests recursively). If the
implementer takes advantage of the attribution chain
mechanims the permissions for the entire chain are
checked at mic access time and all apps are blamed
only once.
Fixed a few bugs around finishing ops for attribution
chains. Also ensured that any app death in a started
attribution chain would lead to finishing the op for
this app
bug: 158792096
Test: (added tests for speech reco)
atest CtsMediaTestCases
atest CtsPermissionTestCases
atest CtsPermission2TestCases
atest CtsPermission3TestCases
atest CtsPermission4TestCases
atest CtsPermission5TestCases
atest CtsAppOpsTestCases
atest CtsAppOps2TestCases
Merged-In: Ic92c7adc14bd2d135ac13b96f17a1b393dd562e4
Change-Id: Ic92c7adc14bd2d135ac13b96f17a1b393dd562e4
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Separate the internal state of AttributionSource from the
class to make it a simple AIDL we can translate automatically
to native - keeping Java and native parts in sync. This
would allow writing a thin native lib for checking attribution
source permissions which would be used to teach camera and
audio about attributions.
Deinfe an AIDL interface for passing around an attribution
source and opr performing permission checker oprations allowing
native and Java permission checks on attribution chains to be
handled. The Java side permission checker functions are in a dedicated
permisison checker service on top of which sits the PermissionChecker.
We expose similar PermissionChecker native APIs sitting on top
of the same remote interface. The nice thing is that we have
native and Java permisison checkers in sync sharing remoting
code and being close in shape.
For now the PermissionChecker in Java is divorced from the
PermissionManager but in T we will consider how to unify them,
either by an extension object on the PermmissionManager or
APIs on the PermissionManager, or another approach, and then
migrate clients off the PermissionChecker APIs.
Sync app ops were not tracked across multiple binder calls which
prevents moving the permission checks in the system server as
this adds one more hop. Now sync ops are propagated backed the
call stack and only the ops for the package are dispatched to
it and the rest are propagated back to the caller, recursively.
bug: 158792096
Test: atest CtsPermission5TestCases
atest CtsAppOps2TestCases
atest CtsPermissionTestCases
atest CtsPermission2TestCases
atest CtsPermission3TestCases
atest CtsPermission4TestCases
atest CtsPermission5TestCases
Change-Id: Ia5cbd2eb20a2da172a5960afdddd7e467f4bcb0d
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Revert "Prepare AttributionSource to expose to native - native"
Revert submission 14225527-bug-158792096-04/16/21-1
Reason for revert: b/186467053
Reverted Changes:
I16740cc2d:Prepare AttributionSource to expose to native - na...
I4e050e78b:Prepare AttributionSource to expose to native
Change-Id: I83e4091231241c2211edf5745735f4ee993c6680
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Separate the internal state of AttributionSource from the
class to make it a simple AIDL we can translate automatically
to native - keeping Java and native parts in sync. This
would allow writing a thin native lib for checking attribution
source permissions which would be used to teach camera and
audio about attributions.
Deinfe an AIDL interface for passing around an attribution
source and opr performing permission checker oprations allowing
native and Java permission checks on attribution chains to be
handled. The Java side permission checker functions are in a dedicated
permisison checker service on top of which sits the PermissionChecker.
We expose similar PermissionChecker native APIs sitting on top
of the same remote interface. The nice thing is that we have
native and Java permisison checkers in sync sharing remoting
code and being close in shape.
For now the PermissionChecker in Java is divorced from the
PermissionManager but in T we will consider how to unify them,
either by an extension object on the PermmissionManager or
APIs on the PermissionManager, or another approach, and then
migrate clients off the PermissionChecker APIs.
bug: 158792096
Test: atest CtsPermission5TestCases
Change-Id: I4e050e78b2361cbf524cc213802e0fef5b487f67
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Bug: 182423603
Test: none
Change-Id: I3c92a3150d3f22b4ed072a66d6b080e00a7ddabe
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Codegen is a tool that generates parcelable classes from
field declarations. Hence, the @SystemApi annotations are
placed on the field and the tool propagetes them to the
generated APIs. We need to update the AnnotationTest to
either ingore these generated classes or ignore private
fields annotated with @SystemApi as they are not API in
practice. This CL removes the annotations to fix the test.
bug: 184086213
Test: atest android.signature.cts.api.AnnotationTest
Change-Id: Ibe9059f20d95d4cda4eb402704e3c4c002ff0e47
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Propagate renounced permissions from context params
to the context attribution source. Throw if one
tries to request at runtime a renounced permission.
Also make the AttributionSource take null for the
setters to ease usage, otherwise folks should always
check for null before calling a builder method.
Additionally, we allow apps that have UPDATE_APP_OPS_STATS
to register arbitrary trusted AttributionSource for
testing. Note that this permission allows abritrary app
op operations, thus we are not relaxing the security
model.
bug: 158792096
Test: atest CtsPermission5TestCases
Change-Id: I4330684bb8695fb998cf31e9363b94ad981ba2cc
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When an app is proxying access to runtime permission protected
data it needs to check whether the calling app has a permission
to the data it is about to proxy which leaves a trace in app ops
that the requesting app perofmed a data access. However, then the
app doing the work needs to get the protected data itself from the
OS which access gets attributed only to itself. As a result there
are two data accesses in app ops where only the first one is a
proxy one that app A got access to Foo through app B - that is the
one we want to show in the permission tracking UIs - and one
for the data access - that is the one we would want to blame on
the calling app, and in fact, these two accesses should be one -
that app A accessed Foo though B. This limitation requires fragile
one off workarounds where both accesses use the same attribution
tag and sys UI has hardcoded rules to dedupe. Since this is not
documented we cannot expect that the ecosystem would reliably
do this workaround in apps that that the workaround in the OS
would be respected by every OEM.
This change adds a mechaism to resolve this issue. It allows for
an app to create an attribution context for another app and then
any private data access thorugh this context would result in a
single app op blame that A accessed Foo though B, i.e. we no longer
have double accounting. Also this can be nested through apps, e.g.
app A asks app B which asks app C for contacts. In this case app
B creates an attribution context for app A and calls into app C
which creates an attribution context for app B. When app C gets
contacts the entire attribution chain would get a porper, single
blame: that C accessed the data, that B got the data from C, and
that A got the data form B. Furthermore, this mechanism ensures
that apps cannot forget to check permissions for the caller
before proxying private data. In our example B and C don't need
to check the permisisons for A and B, respectively, since the
permisisons for the entire attribution chain are checked before
data delivery. Attribution chains are not forgeable preventing
a bad actor to create an arbitrary one - each attribution is
created by the app it refers to and points to a chain of
attributions created by their corresponding apps.
This change also fixes a bug where all content provider accesses
were double counted in app ops due to double noting. While at
this it also fixes that apps can now access their own last ops.
There was a bug where one could not pass null getting the attributed
ops from a historical package ops while this is a valid use case
since if there is no attribution everything is mapped to the null
tag. There were some app op APIs not being piped thorough the app
ops delegate and by extension through the app ops policy. Also
now that we have nice way to express the permission chain in a
call we no longer need the special casing in activity manager to
handle content provider accesses through the OS. Fixed a bug
where we don't properly handle the android.os.shell calls with
an invlaid tag which was failing while the shell can do any tag.
Finally, to ensure the mechanims is validated and works end-to-end
we are adding support for a voice recognizer to blame the client
app for the mic access. The recognition service can create a blaming
context when opening the mic and if the mic is open, which would
do all permission checks, we would not do so again. Since changes
to PermissionChercker for handling attribution sources were made
the CL also hooks up renounced permissoins in the request permission
flow and in the permission checks.
bug:158792096
bug:180647319
Test:atest CtsPermissionsTestCases
atest CtsPermissions2TestCases
atest CtsPermissions3TestCases
atest CtsPermissions4TestCases
atest CtsPermissions5TestCases
atest CtsAppOpsTestCases
atest CtsAppOps2TestCases
Change-Id: Ib04585515d3dc3956966005ae9d94955b2f3ee08
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