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https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm into cm-14.1
Android 7.1.1 Release 0.52 (N4F26W,seed)
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Limit filesystem stacking to prevent stack overflow.
Bug: 32761463
Change-Id: I8b1462b9c0d6c7f00cf110724ffb17e7f307c51e
Signed-off-by: Andrew Chant <achant@google.com>
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Bug: 30954918
Change-Id: I8163d3f86dd7aadb2ab3fc11816754f331986f05
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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The current mainline has copies propagated to *all* nodes, then
tears down the copies we made for nodes that do not contain
counterparts of the desired mountpoint. That sets the right
propagation graph for the copies (at teardown time we move
the slaves of removed node to a surviving peer or directly
to master), but we end up paying a fairly steep price in
useless allocations. It's fairly easy to create a situation
where N calls of mount(2) create exactly N bindings, with
O(N^2) vfsmounts allocated and freed in process.
Fortunately, it is possible to avoid those allocations/freeings.
The trick is to create copies in the right order and find which
one would've eventually become a master with the current algorithm.
It turns out to be possible in O(nodes getting propagation) time
and with no extra allocations at all.
One part is that we need to make sure that eventual master will be
created before its slaves, so we need to walk the propagation
tree in a different order - by peer groups. And iterate through
the peers before dealing with the next group.
Another thing is finding the (earlier) copy that will be a master
of one we are about to create; to do that we are (temporary) marking
the masters of mountpoints we are attaching the copies to.
Either we are in a peer of the last mountpoint we'd dealt with,
or we have the following situation: we are attaching to mountpoint M,
the last copy S_0 had been attached to M_0 and there are sequences
S_0...S_n, M_0...M_n such that S_{i+1} is a master of S_{i},
S_{i} mounted on M{i} and we need to create a slave of the first S_{k}
such that M is getting propagation from M_{k}. It means that the master
of M_{k} will be among the sequence of masters of M. On the
other hand, the nearest marked node in that sequence will either
be the master of M_{k} or the master of M_{k-1} (the latter -
in the case if M_{k-1} is a slave of something M gets propagation
from, but in a wrong peer group).
So we go through the sequence of masters of M until we find
a marked one (P). Let N be the one before it. Then we go through
the sequence of masters of S_0 until we find one (say, S) mounted
on a node D that has P as master and check if D is a peer of N.
If it is, S will be the master of new copy, if not - the master of S
will be.
That's it for the hard part; the rest is fairly simple. Iterator
is in next_group(), handling of one prospective mountpoint is
propagate_one().
It seems to survive all tests and gives a noticably better performance
than the current mainline for setups that are seriously using shared
subtrees.
Change-Id: I45648e8a405544f768c5956711bdbdf509e2705a
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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If the dest_mnt is not shared, propagate_mnt() does nothing -
there's no mounts to propagate to and thus no copies to create.
Might as well don't bother calling it in that case.
Change-Id: Id94af8ad288bf9bfc6ffb5570562bbc2dc2e0d87
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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propagate_remount was not accounting for the slave mounts
of other slave mounts, leading to some namespaces not
recieving the remount information.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 33731928
Change-Id: Idc9e8c2ed126a4143229fc23f10a959c2d0a3854
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There is no point deleting entries from dlist, as
that is a temporary list on the stack from which
contains only entries that are being deleted.
Not all code paths set up dlist, so those that
don't were performing invalid accesses in
hash_del_rcu. As an additional means to prevent
any other issue, we null out the list entries when
we allocate from the cache.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 35666680
Change-Id: Ibb1e28c08c3a600c29418d39ba1c0f3db3bf31e5
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This comes from the wrapfs patch
2e346c83b26e Wrapfs: support direct-IO (DIO) operations
Signed-off-by: Li Mengyang <li.mengyang@stonybrook.edu>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 34133558
Change-Id: I3fd779c510ab70d56b1d918f99c20421b524cdc4
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This comes from the wrapfs patch
3dfec0ffe5e2 Wrapfs: implement vm_ops->page_mkwrite
Some file systems (e.g., ext4) require it. Reported by Ted Ts'o.
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 34133558
Change-Id: I1a389b2422c654a6d3046bb8ec3e20511aebfa8e
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"ANDROID: sdcardfs: Add GID Derivation to sdcardfs" introduced
an unbalanced pat_get, leading to storage space not being freed
after deleting a file until rebooting. This adds the missing path_put.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 34691169
Change-Id: Ia7ef97ec2eca2c555cc06b235715635afc87940e
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This adds back the hash calculation removed as part of
the previous patch, as it is in fact necessary.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 35307857
Change-Id: Ie607332bcf2c5d2efdf924e4060ef3f576bf25dc
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This moves our uses of strcasecmp over to an internal call so we can
easily change implementations later if we so desire. Additionally,
we leverage qstr's where appropriate to save time on comparisons.
Change-Id: I32fdc4fd0cd3b7b735dcfd82f60a2516fd8272a5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Use the kernel's string hash function instead of rolling
our own. Additionally, save a bit of calculation by using
the qstr struct in place of strings.
Change-Id: I0bbeb5ec2a9233f40135ad632e6f22c30ffa95c1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This changes sdcardfs to modify the user and group in the
underlying filesystem depending on its usage. Ownership is
set by Android user, and package, as well as if the file is
under obb or cache. Other files can be labeled by extension.
Those values are set via the configfs interace.
To add an entry,
mkdir -p [configfs root]/sdcardfs/extensions/[gid]/[ext]
Bug: 34262585
Change-Id: I4e030ce84f094a678376349b1a96923e5076a0f4
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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We call get_derived_permission_new unconditionally, so we don't need
to call update_derived_permission_lock, which does the same thing.
Change-Id: I0748100828c6af806da807241a33bf42be614935
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This allows you to hide the existence of a package from
a user by adding them to an exclude list. If a user
creates that package's folder and is on the exclude list,
they will not see that package's id.
Bug: 34542611
Change-Id: I9eb82e0bf2457d7eb81ee56153b9c7d2f6646323
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This refactors the configfs code to be more easily extended.
It will allow additional files to be added easily.
Bug: 34542611
Bug: 34262585
Change-Id: I73c9b0ae5ca7eb27f4ebef3e6807f088b512d539
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This modifies the permission checks in setattr to
allow for non-owners to modify the timestamp of
files to things other than the current time.
This still requires write access, as enforced by
the permission call, but relaxes the requirement
that the caller must be the owner, allowing those
with group permissions to change it as well.
Bug: 11118565
Change-Id: Ied31f0cce2797675c7ef179eeb4e088185adcbad
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Change-Id: I75fcba66a9839c3be8dc11ced25105c87ac4ee65
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Git-commit: b2497fc3057ae27db9aa29579f16ae5afb6d6d08
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common.git
Signed-off-by: Kaushal Kumar <kaushalk@codeaurora.org>
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New method - ->iterate(file, ctx). That's the replacement for ->readdir();
it takes callback from ctx->actor, uses ctx->pos instead of file->f_pos and
calls dir_emit(ctx, ...) instead of filldir(data, ...). It does *not*
update file->f_pos (or look at it, for that matter); iterate_dir() does the
update.
Note that dir_emit() takes the offset from ctx->pos (and eventually
filldir_t will lose that argument).
Change-Id: I24c029f536689d809e804c6f742a5f28070e4a2e
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Git-commit: 83fd542759010949ac7d9638b615fac1bb9744e1
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common.git
Signed-off-by: Kaushal Kumar <kaushalk@codeaurora.org>
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iterate_dir(): new helper, replacing vfs_readdir().
struct dir_context: contains the readdir callback (and will get more stuff
in it), embedded into whatever data that callback wants to deal with;
eventually, we'll be passing it to ->readdir() replacement instead of
(data,filldir) pair.
Change-Id: I2285e5832093a0bbd7dd42b5e4cf26d62703c34e
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Git-commit: c301a0e047e401d41b26db1009d08e088ae2365a
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common.git
Signed-off-by: Kaushal Kumar <kaushalk@codeaurora.org>
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This allows filesystems to use their mount private data to
influence the permssions they use in setattr2. It has
been separated into a new call to avoid disrupting current
setattr users.
Change-Id: I19959038309284448f1b7f232d579674ef546385
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Now we pass the vfsmount when mounting and remounting.
This allows the filesystem to actually set up the mount
specific data, although we can't quite do anything with
it yet. show_options is expanded to include data that
lives with the mount.
To avoid changing existing filesystems, these have
been added as new vfs functions.
Change-Id: If80670bfad9f287abb8ac22457e1b034c9697097
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This starts to add private data associated directly
to mount points. The intent is to give filesystems
a sense of where they have come from, as a means of
letting a filesystem take different actions based on
this information.
Change-Id: Ie769d7b3bb2f5972afe05c1bf16cf88c91647ab2
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Allows FUSE to report to inotify that it is acting
as a layered filesystem. The userspace component
returns a string representing the location of the
underlying file. If the string cannot be resolved
into a path, the top level path is returned instead.
bug: 23904372
Change-Id: Iabdca0bbedfbff59e9c820c58636a68ef9683d9f
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Don't use lookup_one_len so we can grab the spinlock that
protects d_subdirs.
Bug: 30954918
Change-Id: I0c6a393252db7beb467e0d563739a3a14e1b5115
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This switches sdcardfs over to using permission2.
Instead of mounting several sdcardfs instances onto
the same underlaying directory, you bind mount a
single mount several times, and remount with the
options you want. These are stored in the private
mount data, allowing you to maintain the same tree,
but have different permissions for different mount
points.
Warning functions have been added for permission,
as it should never be called, and the correct
behavior is unclear.
Change-Id: I841b1d70ec60cf2b866fa48edeb74a0b0f8334f5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Adds support for mount2, remount2, and the functions
to allocate/clone/copy the private data
The next patch will switch over to actually using it.
Change-Id: I8a43da26021d33401f655f0b2784ead161c575e3
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ic7e0fb8fdcebb31e657b079fe02ac834c4a50db9
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This removes a deadlock under low memory conditions.
filp_open can call lookup_slow, which will attempt to
lock the parent.
Change-Id: I940643d0793f5051d1e79a56f4da2fa8ca3d8ff7
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Symptom: App cannot write into per-app folder
Root Cause: sdcardfs exports incorrect uid
Solution: fix uid
Project: All
Note:
Test done by RD: passed
Change-Id: Iff64f6f40ba4c679f07f4426d3db6e6d0db7e3ca
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Adding packages to the package list and moving files
takes a large amount of locks, and is currently a
heavy operation. This adds a 'top' field to the
inode_info, which points to the inode for the top
most directory whose owner you would like to match.
On permission checks and get_attr, we look up the
owner based on the information at top. When we change
a package mapping, we need only modify the information
in the corresponding top inode_info's. When renaming,
we must ensure top is set correctly in all children.
This happens when an app specific folder gets moved
outside of the folder for that app.
Change-Id: Ib749c60b568e9a45a46f8ceed985c1338246ec6c
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Switched the package id hashmap to use RCU.
Change-Id: I9fdcab279009005bf28536247d11e13babab0b93
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Iterating over d_subdirs requires taking d_lock.
Removed several unneeded locks.
Change-Id: I5b1588e54c7e6ee19b756d6705171c7f829e2650
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This fixes a bug where the first lookup of a
file or folder created under a different view
would not be case insensitive. It will now
search through for a case insensitive match
if the initial lookup fails.
Bug:28024488
Change-Id: I4ff9ce297b9f2f9864b47540e740fd491c545229
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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The mode on files created on the lower fs should
not be affected by the umask of the calling
task's fs_struct. Instead, we create a copy
and modify it as needed. This also lets us avoid
the string shenanigans around .nomedia files.
Bug: 27992761
Change-Id: Ia3a6e56c24c6e19b3b01c1827e46403bb71c2f4c
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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List_for_each_entry has the property that the first argument is always
bound to a real list element, never NULL, so testing dentry is not needed.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/iterators/itnull.cocci
Change-Id: I51033a2649eb39451862b35b6358fe5cfe25c5f5
Cc: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
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This allows filesystems to use their mount private data to
influence the permssions they return in permission2. It has
been separated into a new call to avoid disrupting current
permission users.
Change-Id: I9d416e3b8b6eca84ef3e336bd2af89ddd51df6ca
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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bug: 23904372
Change-Id: I4a686d64b6de37decf60019be1718e1d820193e6
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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Patch "vfs: add d_canonical_path for stacked filesystem support"
erroneously updated the ALL_INOTIFY_BITS count. This changes it back
Change-Id: Idb04edc736da276159d30f04c40cff9d6b1e070f
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Inotify does not currently know when a filesystem
is acting as a wrapper around another fs. This means
that inotify watchers will miss any modifications to
the base file, as well as any made in a separate
stacked fs that points to the same file.
d_canonical_path solves this problem by allowing the fs
to map a dentry to a path in the lower fs. Inotify
can use it to find the appropriate place to watch to
be informed of all changes to a file.
Change-Id: I09563baffad1711a045e45c1bd0bd8713c2cc0b6
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This reverts commit c58e6f11aa1253ebf301721acb21228b846b8975.
Change-Id: I02101b0061e2e6f1c9c5fd5c46cb04f539a63c29
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https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm into HEAD
Android 7.1.1 Release 0.31 (N4F26P,seed)
Change-Id: I8d0feb72827ef1a65a50d486e151c19a2e6f4927
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struct
If there is a failure while allocating the preallocation structure, a
number of blocks can end up getting marked in the in-memory buddy
bitmap, and then not getting released. This can result in the
following corruption getting reported by the kernel:
EXT4-fs error (device sda3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:758: group 1126,
12793 clusters in bitmap, 12729 in gd
In that case, we need to release the blocks using mb_free_blocks().
Tested: fs smoke test; also demonstrated that with injected errors,
the file system is no longer getting corrupted
Bug: 32645639
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Change-Id: I251a902541a566c1e4898fe02be1a345aefcd89d
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As mentioned in commit 52ee2dfdd4f51cf422ea6a96a0846dc94244aa37
("pids: refactor vnr/nr_ns helpers to make them safe"). *_nr_ns
helpers used to be buggy. The commit addresses most of the helpers but
is missing task_tgid_xxx()
Without this protection there is a possible use after free reported by
kasan instrumented kernel:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_tgid_nr_ns+0x2c/0x44 at addr ***
Read of size 8 by task cat/2472
CPU: 1 PID: 2472 Comm: cat Tainted: ****
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc00020ad2c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x17c
[<ffffffc00020aec0>] show_stack+0x18/0x24
[<ffffffc0011573d0>] dump_stack+0x94/0x100
[<ffffffc0003c7dc0>] kasan_report+0x308/0x554
[<ffffffc0003c7518>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x7c
[<ffffffc00025a54c>] task_tgid_nr_ns+0x28/0x44
[<ffffffc00046951c>] proc_pid_status+0x444/0x1080
[<ffffffc000460f60>] proc_single_show+0x8c/0xdc
[<ffffffc0004081b0>] seq_read+0x2e8/0x6f0
[<ffffffc0003d1420>] vfs_read+0xd8/0x1e0
[<ffffffc0003d1b98>] SyS_read+0x68/0xd4
Accessing group_leader while holding rcu_lock and using the now safe
helpers introduced in the commit mentioned, this race condition is
addressed.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Change-Id: I4315217922dda375a30a3581c0c1740dda7b531b
Bug: 31495866
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This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a)
Bug: 31711619
Change-Id: I9f2872703bef240d6b82320c744529459bb076dc
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(cherry picked from commit 8ba8682107ee2ca3347354e018865d8e1967c5f4)
get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid, child;
long nproc, i;
/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);
nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
for (;;) {
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
_exit(0);
} else {
child = wait(NULL);
assert(child == pid);
}
}
}
pid = fork();
assert(pid != -1);
if (pid == 0) {
for (;;) {
/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
}
}
}
for (;;) {
/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
}
return 0;
}
This gets us KASAN dumps like this:
[ 35.526914] ==================================================================
[ 35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[ 35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[ 35.530009] =============================================================================
[ 35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[ 35.530009] ___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[ 35.530009] __slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[ 35.530009] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[ 35.530009] create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[ 35.530009] get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[ 35.530009] copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[ 35.530009] _do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[ 35.530009] SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[ 35.530009] do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[ 35.530009] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[ 35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[ 35.530009] __slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[ 35.530009] kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[ 35.530009] put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[ 35.530009] put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[ 35.530009] exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[ 35.530009] do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[ 35.530009] do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[ 35.530009] SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[ 35.530009] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[ 35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[ 35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[ 35.530009] ==================================================================
Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Change-Id: I3f5858cc9a1b9d4124ae7a6578660dec219d2c57
Bug: 30946378
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(cherry picked from commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3)
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: Ia2f58d48c15478ed4b6e237b63e704c70ff21e96
Bug: 30951939
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Implement Samsung's FMODE_NONMAPPABLE flag from
sdcardfs version 2.1.4 as we hit a BUG on ext4:
[ 49.655037]@0 Kernel BUG at ffffffc0001deeec [verbose debug info unavailable]
[ 49.655045]@0 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 49.655052]@0 Modules linked in:
[ 49.655061]@0 CPU: 0 PID: 283 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G W 3.18.20-perf-g3be2054-00086-ga8307fb #1
[ 49.655070]@0 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. MSM 8996 v3 + PMI8996 MTP (DT)
[ 49.655077]@0 Workqueue: writeback bdi_writeback_workfn (flush-8:0)
[ 49.655096]@0 task: ffffffc174ba8b00 ti: ffffffc174bb4000 task.ti: ffffffc174bb4000
[ 49.655108]@0 PC is at mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x198/0x218
[ 49.655116]@0 LR is at mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x110/0x218
[ 49.655121]@0 pc : [<ffffffc0001deeec>] lr : [<ffffffc0001dee64>] pstate: 60000145
[ 49.655126]@0 sp : ffffffc174bb7800
[ 49.655130]@0 x29: ffffffc174bb7800 x28: ffffffc174bb7880
[ 49.655140]@0 x27: 000000000000000d x26: ffffffc1245505e8
[ 49.655149]@0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000003400
[ 49.655160]@0 x23: ffffffffffffffff x22: 0000000000000000
[ 49.655172]@0 x21: ffffffc174bb7888 x20: ffffffc174bb79e0
[ 49.655182]@0 x19: ffffffbdc4ee7b80 x18: 0000007f92872000
[ 49.655191]@0 x17: 0000007f959b6424 x16: ffffffc00016d1ac
[ 49.655201]@0 x15: 0000007f9285d158 x14: ffffffc1734796e8
[ 49.655210]@0 x13: ffffffbdc1ffa4c0 x12: ffffffbdc4ee7b80
[ 49.655220]@0 x11: 0000000000000100 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 49.655229]@0 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffffffc0b444e210
[ 49.655237]@0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffffc0b444e1e0
[ 49.655246]@0 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001
[ 49.655254]@0 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 400000000002003d
[ 49.655263]@0 x1 : ffffffbdc4ee7b80 x0 : 400000000002003d
[ 49.655271]@0
[ 49.656502]@0 Process kworker/u8:7 (pid: 283, stack limit = 0xffffffc174bb4058)
[ 49.656509]@0 Call trace:
[ 49.656514]@0 [<ffffffc0001deeec>] mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x198/0x218
[ 49.656526]@0 [<ffffffc0001e28d0>] ext4_writepages+0x270/0xa58
[ 49.656533]@0 [<ffffffc00012982c>] do_writepages+0x24/0x40
[ 49.656541]@0 [<ffffffc000180160>] __writeback_single_inode+0x40/0x114
[ 49.656549]@0 [<ffffffc000180e50>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dc/0x34c
[ 49.656555]@0 [<ffffffc00018103c>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x7c/0xc4
[ 49.656560]@0 [<ffffffc000181224>] wb_writeback+0x110/0x1a8
[ 49.656565]@0 [<ffffffc000181344>] wb_check_old_data_flush+0x88/0x98
[ 49.656571]@0 [<ffffffc00018156c>] bdi_writeback_workfn+0xf4/0x1fc
[ 49.656576]@0 [<ffffffc0000b14f8>] process_one_work+0x1e0/0x300
[ 49.656585]@0 [<ffffffc0000b1e14>] worker_thread+0x318/0x438
[ 49.656590]@0 [<ffffffc0000b5da0>] kthread+0xe0/0xec
[ 49.656598]@0 Code: f9400260 f9400a63 1ad92063 37580040 (e7f001f2)
[ 49.656604]@0 ---[ end trace cbed09f772fd630d ]---
Conflicts:
include/linux/fs.h
mm/mmap.c
Change-Id: I931da7cb3841db1f130dba298a7d256b6f02d1bc
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packages_gid.list was improperly returning the wrong
count. Use scnprintf instead, and inform the user that
the list was truncated if it is.
Bug: 30013843
Change-Id: Ida2b2ef7cd86dd87300bfb4c2cdb6bfe2ee1650d
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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