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Change-Id: I6f47d9424454492b0953231716a44c27068d70ec
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commit bd7a3fe770ebd8391d1c7d072ff88e9e76d063eb
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for a USB interface
association descriptor. He writes:
It seems there's no proper size check of a USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION
descriptor. It's only checked that the size is >= 2 in
usb_parse_configuration(), so find_iad() might do out-of-bounds access
to intf_assoc->bInterfaceCount.
And he's right, we don't check for crazy descriptors of this type very well, so
resolve this problem. Yet another issue found by syzkaller...
Change-Id: I2cc3b5a66d16abd0fc567d69457fc90a45eb12d8
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for
routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed
correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses
socket marks to route packets via different networks.
Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of
zero, making routing incorrect on such systems.
This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and
a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output
mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways:
1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while
the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence
the routing) of the packets emitted by those states.
2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of
the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output
mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state.
The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For
example:
- A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside
tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it,
one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA.
- On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets
emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that
is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the
unencrypted packets.
- Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without
breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based
routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use
the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could
change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups.
If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not
set or changed.
[backport of upstream 077fbac405bfc6d41419ad6c1725804ad4e9887c]
Bug: 63589535
Test: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776/ passes
Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Change-Id: I76120fba036e21780ced31ad390faf491ea81e52
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Almost clean cherry pick of c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895,
includes change made by merge 0891ad829d2a0501053703df66029e843e3b8365.
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I189ba74070dd6d918b0fdf83ff30bb74ec0f7556
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df998475736f3e2727701bd31e3751a9)
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Conflicts:
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
drivers/hid/hid-lg.c
drivers/hid/hid-lg4ff.c
drivers/misc/Kconfig
drivers/misc/Makefile
fs/f2fs/segment.c
fs/inode.c
fs/namei.c
fs/sdcardfs/derived_perm.c
fs/sdcardfs/file.c
fs/sdcardfs/main.c
fs/udf/inode.c
fs/udf/symlink.c
include/linux/mount.h
mm/memory.c
net/ipv4/raw.c
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
Change-Id: Ia951dab4c2fb6dbd2d55c97db22b18085a4af5a2
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This implements:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7559
Backoff is performed according to RFC3315 section 14:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3315#section-14
We allow setting /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/*/router_solicitations
to a negative value meaning an unlimited number of retransmits,
and we make this the new default (inline with the RFC).
We also add a new setting:
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/*/router_solicitation_max_interval
defaulting to 1 hour (per RFC recommendation).
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Acked-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit bd11f0741fa5a2c296629898ad07759dd12b35bb in
DaveM's net-next/master, should make Linus' tree in 4.9-rc1)
Change-Id: Ia32cdc5c61481893ef8040734e014bf2229fc39e
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This commit adds a new sysctl accept_ra_rt_info_min_plen that
defines the minimum acceptable prefix length of Route Information
Options. The new sysctl is intended to be used together with
accept_ra_rt_info_max_plen to configure a range of acceptable
prefix lengths. It is useful to prevent misconfigurations from
unintentionally blackholing too much of the IPv6 address space
(e.g., home routers announcing RIOs for fc00::/7, which is
incorrect).
[backport of net-next bbea124bc99df968011e76eba105fe964a4eceab]
Bug: 33333670
Test: net_test passes
Signed-off-by: Joel Scherpelz <jscherpelz@google.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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binder_fd_array_object starts with a 4-byte header,
followed by a few fields that are 8 bytes when
ANDROID_BINDER_IPC_32BIT=N.
This can cause alignment issues in a 64-bit kernel
with a 32-bit userspace, as on x86_32 an 8-byte primitive
may be aligned to a 4-byte address. Pad with a __u32
to fix this.
Change-Id: I4374ed2cc3ccd3c6a1474cb7209b53ebfd91077b
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 651be3cb085341a21847e47c694c249c3e1e4e5b)
We only support breakpoint/watchpoint of length 1, 2, 4 and 8. If we can
support other length as well, then user may watch more data with less
number of watchpoints (provided hardware supports it). For example: if we
have to watch only 4th, 5th and 6th byte from a 64 bit aligned address, we
will have to use two slots to implement it currently. One slot will watch a
half word at offset 4 and other a byte at offset 6. If we can have a
watchpoint of length 3 then we can watch it with single slot as well.
ARM64 hardware does support such functionality, therefore adding these new
definitions in generic layer.
Change-Id: I807c508ca27dfb2a809d544cd718da36fc531179
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
[tools/include/uapi/linux/hw_breakpoint.h is not present in this branch]
Bug: 30919905
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- Define a new FIB rule attributes, FRA_UID_RANGE, to describe a
range of UIDs.
- Define a RTA_UID attribute for per-UID route lookups and dumps.
- Support passing these attributes to and from userspace via
rtnetlink. The value INVALID_UID indicates no UID was
specified.
- Add a UID field to the flow structures.
[Backport of net-next 622ec2c9d52405973c9f1ca5116eb1c393adfc7d]
Bug: 16355602
Change-Id: Iea98e6fedd0fd4435a1f4efa3deb3629505619ab
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit 99a6ea48b591877d1cd6a51732c40a1d5321d961.
Bug: 16355602
Change-Id: I7d75b52d8863e932707daf391892480542c2e965
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Sdcardfs uses the same magic value as wrapfs.
This should not be the case. As it is entirely
in memory, the value can be changed without any
loss of compatibility.
Change-Id: I24200b805d5e6d32702638be99e47d50d7f2f746
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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This patch introduces a new binder_fd_array object,
that allows us to support one or more file descriptors
embedded in a buffer that is scatter-gathered.
Change-Id: I647a53cf0d905c7be0dfd9333806982def68dd74
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
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Previously all data passed over binder needed
to be serialized, with the exception of Binder
objects and file descriptors.
This patchs adds support for scatter-gathering raw
memory buffers into a binder transaction, avoiding
the need to first serialize them into a Parcel.
To remain backwards compatibile with existing
binder clients, it introduces two new command
ioctls for this purpose - BC_TRANSACTION_SG and
BC_REPLY_SG. These commands may only be used with
the new binder_transaction_data_sg structure,
which adds a field for the total size of the
buffers we are scatter-gathering.
Because memory buffers may contain pointers to
other buffers, we allow callers to specify
a parent buffer and an offset into it, to indicate
this is a location pointing to the buffer that
we are fixing up. The kernel will then take care
of fixing up the pointer to that buffer as well.
Change-Id: I02417f28cff14688f2e1d6fcb959438fd96566cc
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
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flat_binder_object is used for both handling
binder objects and file descriptors, even though
the two are mostly independent. Since we'll
have more fixup objects in binder in the future,
instead of extending flat_binder_object again,
split out file descriptors to their own object
while retaining backwards compatibility to
existing user-space clients. All binder objects
just share a header.
Change-Id: If3c55f27a2aa8f21815383e0e807be47895e4786
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
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Sdcardfs uses the same magic value as wrapfs.
This should not be the case. As it is entirely
in memory, the value can be changed without any
loss of compatibility.
Change-Id: I24200b805d5e6d32702638be99e47d50d7f2f746
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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3724945 net: inet: diag: expose the socket mark to privileged processes.
a6226bb net: diag: make udp_diag_destroy work for mapped addresses.
f7d5f82 net: diag: support SOCK_DESTROY for UDP sockets
d4c5e38 net: diag: allow socket bytecode filters to match socket marks
4a63970 net: diag: slightly refactor the inet_diag_bc_audit error checks.
41e1e3f net: diag: Add support to filter on device index
4bc74f1 BACKPORT: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
8c43520 UPSTREAM: ARM: 8494/1: mm: Enable PXN when running non-LPAE kernel on LPAE processor
5bc4531 BACKPORT: ARM: 8235/1: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 30956807
Bug: 31161206
Change-Id: I9c215bfddcb6b86524f377246a2cbe31a29e0de0
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3724945 net: inet: diag: expose the socket mark to privileged processes.
a6226bb net: diag: make udp_diag_destroy work for mapped addresses.
f7d5f82 net: diag: support SOCK_DESTROY for UDP sockets
d4c5e38 net: diag: allow socket bytecode filters to match socket marks
4a63970 net: diag: slightly refactor the inet_diag_bc_audit error checks.
41e1e3f net: diag: Add support to filter on device index
4bc74f1 BACKPORT: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
8c43520 UPSTREAM: ARM: 8494/1: mm: Enable PXN when running non-LPAE kernel on LPAE processor
5bc4531 BACKPORT: ARM: 8235/1: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 30956807
Bug: 31161206
Change-Id: Ifc7674b118f99a6ea06706b80bdbf2952be80f87
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This adds the capability for a process that has CAP_NET_ADMIN on
a socket to see the socket mark in socket dumps.
Commit a52e95abf772 ("net: diag: allow socket bytecode filters to
match socket marks") recently gave privileged processes the
ability to filter socket dumps based on mark. This patch is
complementary: it ensures that the mark is also passed to
userspace in the socket's netlink attributes. It is useful for
tools like ss which display information about sockets.
[backport of net-next d545caca827b65aab557a9e9dcdcf1e5a3823c2d]
Change-Id: I0c9708aae5ab8dfa296b8a1e6aecceb2a382415a
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/270210
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This allows a privileged process to filter by socket mark when
dumping sockets via INET_DIAG_BY_FAMILY. This is useful on
systems that use mark-based routing such as Android.
The ability to filter socket marks requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, which
is consistent with other privileged operations allowed by the
SOCK_DIAG interface such as the ability to destroy sockets and
the ability to inspect BPF filters attached to packet sockets.
[backport of net-next a52e95abf772b43c9226e9a72d3c1353903ba96f]
Change-Id: Ic02caf628a71007cc7c48c9da220b4088f5aa4f4
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/261350
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add support to inet_diag facility to filter sockets based on device
index. If an interface index is in the filter only sockets bound
to that index (sk_bound_dev_if) are returned.
[backport of net-next 637c841dd7a5f9bd97b75cbe90b526fa1a52e530]
Change-Id: Ib430cfb44f1b3b1a771a561247ee9140737e52fd
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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bdcd4484 UPSTREAM: capabilities: ambient capabilities
0e7ad12 BACKPORT: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix double-free in error paths after snd_usb_add_audio_stream() call
5982d2e BACKPORT: ALSA: usb-audio: Minor code cleanup in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
b581331 pstore: drop pmsg bounce buffer
fbb62d1 UPSTREAM: block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get()
8aaed94 UPSTREAM: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
b307df3 BACKPORT: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
d85e322 Don't show empty tag stats for unprivileged uids
991eaa6 UPSTREAM: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
12f0688 UPSTREAM: [media] xc2028: unlock on error in xc2028_set_config()
9469da1 UPSTREAM: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
300e001 UPSTREAM: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
6a88f39 ANDROID: base-cfg: enable SECCOMP config
801c5f9 UPSTREAM: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
2fac1c2 UPSTREAM: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
e846f8e UPSTREAM: USB: usb_driver_claim_interface: add sanity checking
2633b8d UPSTREAM: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
7a17891 UPSTREAM: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
cb2cecc UPSTREAM: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
4f73004 Revert "netfilter: have ip*t REJECT set the sock err when an icmp is to be sent"
6ff842a ANDROID: MMC: Fix a 32 bit build breakage.
d54ba4d UPSTREAM: af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
9e63349 UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
4a55158 ASoC: check for null function pointer for dummy device read/write
2fbdb8e quadd: add nr_events check
209e5c6 Tegra TLK Driver missing kernel heap allocation succeeded check
NB: removed commits already present, or that were added then reverted
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 31038224
Bug: 30952477
Bug: 31057326
Bug: 30946378
Bug: 30951261
Bug: 30951112
Bug: 31183296
Bug: 27577101
Bug: 27532522
Bug: 30951939
Bug: 30946097
Bug: 30942273
Bug: 28242610
Bug: 28719525
Bug: 28694392
Bug: 28838221
Bug: 29492476
Bug: 30259274
Change-Id: Ibfea605468379918ede2001a8d989d1d28a63653
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bdcd4484 UPSTREAM: capabilities: ambient capabilities
0e7ad12 BACKPORT: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix double-free in error paths after snd_usb_add_audio_stream() call
5982d2e BACKPORT: ALSA: usb-audio: Minor code cleanup in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
b581331 pstore: drop pmsg bounce buffer
fbb62d1 UPSTREAM: block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get()
8aaed94 UPSTREAM: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
b307df3 BACKPORT: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
3f0cd28 UPSTREAM: tcp: fix use after free in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue()
d85e322 Don't show empty tag stats for unprivileged uids
991eaa6 UPSTREAM: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
12f0688 UPSTREAM: [media] xc2028: unlock on error in xc2028_set_config()
9469da1 UPSTREAM: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
300e001 UPSTREAM: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
6a88f39 ANDROID: base-cfg: enable SECCOMP config
801c5f9 UPSTREAM: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
2fac1c2 UPSTREAM: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
e846f8e UPSTREAM: USB: usb_driver_claim_interface: add sanity checking
2633b8d UPSTREAM: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
7a17891 UPSTREAM: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
cb2cecc UPSTREAM: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
4f73004 Revert "netfilter: have ip*t REJECT set the sock err when an icmp is to be sent"
6ff842a ANDROID: MMC: Fix a 32 bit build breakage.
d54ba4d UPSTREAM: af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
9e63349 UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
4a55158 ASoC: check for null function pointer for dummy device read/write
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 31038224
Bug: 30952477
Bug: 31057326
Bug: 30946378
Bug: 30951261
Bug: 30951112
Bug: 31183296
Bug: 27577101
Bug: 27532522
Bug: 30951939
Bug: 30946097
Bug: 30942273
Bug: 28242610
Bug: 28719525
Bug: 28694392
Bug: 28838221
Change-Id: Ia2fc65097eed1d319eccd11fc6b4a2ffd2da73d4
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Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 58319057b7847667f0c9585b9de0e8932b0fdb08)
Bug: 31038224
Change-Id: I88bc5caa782dc6be23dc7e839ff8e11b9a903f8c
Signed-off-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@google.com>
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This is the 3.10.103 stable release
Bug: 28242610
Bug: 30259163
Change-Id: I9c7adb67d707ab840232cea4b6ba5374b7d82a9e
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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commit 2fc016c5bd8aad2e201cdf71b9fb4573f94775bd upstream.
Add macros for single bit definitions of a specific type. These are
similar to the BIT() macro that already exists, but with a few
exceptions:
1. The namespace is such that they can be used in uapi definitions.
2. The type is set with the _AC() macro to allow it to be used in
assembly.
3. The type is explicitly specified to be UL or ULL.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-nbca8p7cg6jyjoit7klh3o91@git.kernel.org
[wt: backported to 3.10 only to keep next patch clean]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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This reverts commit 1dd641435e09ccf487da2109a4e4a58e8b560f1c.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 29431260
Change-Id: I9e0152893e57cf858ddd65765517ae315037cecb
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BINDER_PEER_SECURITY_CONTEXT allows userspace to retrieve the sender's
security context.
Binder transactions may be freed after reading, and we don't want to
break ABI by embedding this information in struct
binder_transaction_data. We instead keep the sender's secid inside the
correponding (in-kernel) binder_buffer, and add a new ioctl to let
recipients grab this information before they free the buffer.
The design and implementation largely follow getsockopt(SO_PEERSEC) and
SELinux's corresponding socket_getpeersec_stream() implementation
(though written using the generic LSM API).
Bug: 29431260
Change-Id: Id148d31dbdf1b661d386a8867364c4f419229181
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3c71420 BACKPORT: f2fs: add a max block check for get_data_block_bmap
2564b24 fuse: Add support for d_canonical_path
1201271 vfs: change d_canonical_path to take two paths
Conflicts resolved in fs/f2fs/data.c and fs/f2fs/super.c to match
closer to upstream.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 28271368
Bug: 23904372
Change-Id: I6e457228b4f13f3cd723aa84c6257132b076ada9
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3c71420 BACKPORT: f2fs: add a max block check for get_data_block_bmap
2564b24 fuse: Add support for d_canonical_path
1201271 vfs: change d_canonical_path to take two paths
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 28271368
Bug: 23904372
Change-Id: I028c95ad17f47a0a75d0bb16a23e12a30e0dee54
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Allows FUSE to report to inotify that it is acting
as a layered filesystem. The userspace component
returns a string representing the location of the
underlying file. If the string cannot be resolved
into a path, the top level path is returned instead.
bug: 23904372
Change-Id: Iabdca0bbedfbff59e9c820c58636a68ef9683d9f
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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5dc2042 BACKPORT: nl80211: Stop scheduled scan if netlink client disappears
5586920 BACKPORT: cfg80211: allow userspace to take ownership of interfaces
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 25561044
Change-Id: Id956f0aab1113a7f3df936c21cef48122b93f30b
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5dc2042 BACKPORT: nl80211: Stop scheduled scan if netlink client disappears
5586920 BACKPORT: cfg80211: allow userspace to take ownership of interfaces
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 25561044
Change-Id: I214cd05df4e585a8b8d9642a307f988c7b79a6ee
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(cherry pick from commit 93a1e86ce10e4898f9ca9cd09d659a8a7780ee5e)
An attribute NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER can be set by the scan initiator.
If present, the attribute will cause the scan to be stopped if the client
dies.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Bug: 25561044
Change-Id: Ibe4a555b29b64b6df1b9ed4cdcd0f05a69416d14
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(cherry pick from commit 78f22b6a3a9254460d23060530b48ae02a9394e3)
When dynamically creating interfaces from userspace, e.g. for P2P usage,
such interfaces are usually owned by the process that created them, i.e.
wpa_supplicant. Should wpa_supplicant crash, such interfaces will often
cease operating properly and cause problems on restarting the process.
To avoid this problem, introduce an ownership concept for interfaces. If
an interface is owned by a netlink socket, then it will be destroyed if
the netlink socket is closed for any reason, including if the process it
belongs to crashed. This gives us a race-free way to get rid of any such
interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Bug: 25561044
Change-Id: I5a9c8883c5c204ac5d2917ab8492b44daf4b71e7
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Change-Id: I55d6c5433d167cf7f80ffa0b35a3c297aae333cc
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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Change-Id: I5b5772a2bbff9f3a7dda641644630a7b8afacec0
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Conflicts:
drivers/mmc/core/core.c
fs/libfs.c
Bug: 26927535
Bug: 26963541
Bug: 27701995
Change-Id: I0773b5f7e570fd720ca869894e548b2f8e339f83
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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Conflicts:
arch/arc/mm/fault.c
arch/arm/kernel/process.c
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c
arch/arm64/Kconfig
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
drivers/regulator/core.c
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h
drivers/usb/core/hub.c
drivers/video/console/Kconfig
fs/pstore/ram_core.c
include/linux/memcontrol.h
include/linux/mm.h
include/linux/mm_types.h
include/linux/sched.h
ipc/sem.c
kernel/power/qos.c
kernel/time/sched_clock.c
mm/memcontrol.c
mm/memory.c
mm/oom_kill.c
net/ipv4/ping.c
net/wireless/nl80211.c
sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c
sound/usb/pcm.c
Change-Id: If24d32d9e5f441d46ce483df4129a2f51260795d
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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Change-Id: I1b26e63e19292dc294c6856d8d695ac1fd3ed609
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Change-Id: I65fb90fa727879ea53dd33aa72d0acb9b1ab28cc
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commit 3f2cee73b650921b2e214bf487b2061a1c266504 upstream.
The usbfs API has a peculiar hole: Users are not allowed to reap their
URBs after the device has been disconnected. There doesn't seem to be
any good reason for this; it is an ad-hoc inconsistency.
The patch allows users to issue the USBDEVFS_REAPURB and
USBDEVFS_REAPURBNDELAY ioctls (together with their 32-bit counterparts
on 64-bit systems) even after the device is gone. If no URBs are
pending for a disconnected device then the ioctls will return -ENODEV
rather than -EAGAIN, because obviously no new URBs will ever be able
to complete.
The patch also adds a new capability flag for
USBDEVFS_GET_CAPABILITIES to indicate that the reap-after-disconnect
feature is supported.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Chris Dickens <christopher.a.dickens@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Change-Id: I3a254e912f9d09344dfc7d22f561798b9ce536ef
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commit e10038a8ec06ac819b7552bb67aaa6d2d6f850c1 upstream.
This structure is not exposed to userspace, so fix this by defining
struct sk_filter; so we skip the casting in kernelspace. This is safe
since userspace has no way to lurk with that internal pointer.
Fixes: e6f30c7 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Conflicts:
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c
arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
drivers/hid/hid-core.c
drivers/input/evdev.c
include/linux/mm_types.h
include/net/tcp.h
kernel/fork.c
kernel/futex.c
net/ipv4/ping.c
net/ipv4/raw.c
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
net/ipv6/route.c
net/wireless/nl80211.c
Change-Id: Iee241dabd75fe89fdc02d27eaa146b1c4a52a014
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commit 7ac3764fcafc06e72e1a79a9d998b9fdd900b2a6 upstream.
The file include/uapi/linux/usb/cdc-wdm.h uses a __u16 so it needs to
include types.h as well to make the build system happy.
Fixes: 3edce1cf813a ("USB: cdc-wdm: implement IOCTL_WDM_MAX_COMMAND")
Cc: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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