p2a42: Import fully working kernel sourceHEADn7.1

Change-Id: Ia4c94f09e29843b1af34d466243378a357e97b70

12 files changed, 141 insertions, 106 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c
index 128644c0..a9e1e67b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c
@@ -335,16 +335,21 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
 
 static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
 {
-	struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
+	struct sockaddr_rc sa;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	int chan = sa->rc_channel;
-	int err = 0;
-
-	BT_DBG("sk %pK %pMR", sk, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
+	int chan;
+	int len, err = 0;
 
 	if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(sa), addr_len);
+	memcpy(&sa, addr, len);
+	chan = sa.rc_channel;
+
+	BT_DBG("sk %pK %pMR", sk, &sa.rc_bdaddr);
+
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
 	if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
@@ -359,11 +364,11 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr
 
 	write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
 
-	if (chan && __rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(chan, &sa->rc_bdaddr)) {
+	if (chan && __rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(chan, &sa.rc_bdaddr)) {
 		err = -EADDRINUSE;
 	} else {
 		/* Save source address */
-		bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
+		bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &sa.rc_bdaddr);
 		rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = chan;
 		sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
 	}
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index c412db77..c555dd80 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1027,6 +1027,14 @@ static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 			.dma         = dev->dma,
 			.port        = dev->if_port,
 		};
+		memset(&map, 0, sizeof(map));
+		map.mem_start   = dev->mem_start;
+		map.mem_end     = dev->mem_end;
+		map.base_addr   = dev->base_addr;
+		map.irq         = dev->irq;
+		map.dma         = dev->dma;
+		map.port        = dev->if_port;
+
 		if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MAP, sizeof(map), &map))
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 	}
diff --git a/net/ipc_router/ipc_router_socket.c b/net/ipc_router/ipc_router_socket.c
index 828797bd..652531a8 100644
--- a/net/ipc_router/ipc_router_socket.c
+++ b/net/ipc_router/ipc_router_socket.c
@@ -555,10 +555,18 @@ static unsigned int msm_ipc_router_poll(struct file *file,
 static int msm_ipc_router_close(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct msm_ipc_port *port_ptr = msm_ipc_sk_port(sk);
+	struct msm_ipc_port *port_ptr;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!sk)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	lock_sock(sk);
+	port_ptr = msm_ipc_sk_port(sk);
+	if (!port_ptr) {
+		release_sock(sk);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	ret = msm_ipc_router_close_port(port_ptr);
 	msm_ipc_unload_default_node(msm_ipc_sk(sk)->default_node_vote_info);
 	release_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index f95b6f93..738e62d5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -355,11 +355,12 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
 
-	return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
+	       memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
 }
 
 /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
@@ -398,11 +399,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
 
 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
+			if ((unconditional(e) &&
 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
-			    visited) {
+			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -470,14 +470,12 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
+static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -518,10 +516,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
 	target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
 					t->u.user.revision);
@@ -547,7 +541,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	unsigned int verdict;
 
-	if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
+	if (!unconditional(e))
 		return false;
 	t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -566,9 +560,11 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -580,6 +576,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -588,9 +588,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+					 "use the STANDARD target with "
+					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -1224,7 +1224,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 
 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1237,7 +1238,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 99e810f8..2c8fb724 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
 
 /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
 /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 {
 	static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
 
-	return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+	       memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
 #undef FWINV
 }
 
@@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
 	} else if (s == e) {
 		(*rulenum)++;
 
-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+		if (unconditional(s) &&
 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
-		   t->verdict < 0 &&
-		   unconditional(&s->ip)) {
+		   t->verdict < 0) {
 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
 				? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
@@ -472,11 +472,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
 
 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+			if ((unconditional(e) &&
 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
-			    visited) {
+			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -565,14 +564,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -662,10 +659,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -709,7 +702,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	unsigned int verdict;
 
-	if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
+	if (!unconditional(e))
 		return false;
 	t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -729,9 +722,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -743,6 +738,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -751,9 +750,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+					 "use the STANDARD target with "
+					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -1490,7 +1489,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 
 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 3bdea261..cc7f940c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
 
 /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
-int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
+int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
 
 int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
 int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
@@ -3325,13 +3325,20 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk)
 	/* unprotected vars, we dont care of overwrites */
 	static u32 challenge_timestamp;
 	static unsigned int challenge_count;
-	u32 now = jiffies / HZ;
+	u32 count, now;
 
+	/* Check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
+	now = jiffies / HZ;
 	if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
+		u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
+
 		challenge_timestamp = now;
-		challenge_count = 0;
+		WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, half +
+			   prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit));
 	}
-	if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
+	count = READ_ONCE(challenge_count);
+	if (count > 0) {
+		WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, count - 1);
 		NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
 		tcp_send_ack(sk);
 	}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index e080fbbb..bc0615b1 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -195,11 +195,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
 
 /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
 /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 {
 	static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond;
 
-	return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
+	       memcmp(&e->ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
 }
 
 static inline const struct xt_entry_target *
@@ -255,11 +256,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
 	} else if (s == e) {
 		(*rulenum)++;
 
-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
+		if (unconditional(s) &&
 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
-		    t->verdict < 0 &&
-		    unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
+		    t->verdict < 0) {
 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
 				? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
@@ -482,11 +482,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
 
 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
+			if ((unconditional(e) &&
 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
-			     t->verdict < 0 &&
-			     unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) {
+			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -575,14 +574,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -673,10 +670,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -720,7 +713,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	unsigned int verdict;
 
-	if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
+	if (!unconditional(e))
 		return false;
 	t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -740,9 +733,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -754,6 +749,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -762,9 +761,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+					 "use the STANDARD target with "
+					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -1502,7 +1501,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 
 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index e41bab38..daec7d69 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -321,10 +321,12 @@ replay:
 		nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
 		err = 0;
 
-		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) ||
-		    skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto ack;
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN ||
+		    skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
+		    nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct nfgenmsg)) {
+			nfnl_err_reset(&err_list);
+			success = false;
+			goto done;
 		}
 
 		/* Only requests are handled by the kernel */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c b/net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c
index f04d49dd..8cc1d3bc 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c
@@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ static int qtaguid_ctrl_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 			);
 		f_count = atomic_long_read(
 			&sock_tag_entry->socket->file->f_count);
-		seq_printf(m, "sock=%p tag=0x%llx (uid=%u) pid=%u "
+		seq_printf(m, "sock=%pK tag=0x%llx (uid=%u) pid=%u "
 			   "f_count=%lu\n",
 			   sock_tag_entry->sk,
 			   sock_tag_entry->tag, uid,
@@ -2537,8 +2537,7 @@ static int pp_stats_line(struct seq_file *m, struct tag_stat *ts_entry,
 	uid_t stat_uid = get_uid_from_tag(tag);
 	struct proc_print_info *ppi = m->private;
 	/* Detailed tags are not available to everybody */
-	if (get_atag_from_tag(tag) && !can_read_other_uid_stats(
-						make_kuid(&init_user_ns,stat_uid))) {
+	if (!can_read_other_uid_stats(make_kuid(&init_user_ns,stat_uid))) {
 		CT_DEBUG("qtaguid: stats line: "
 			 "%s 0x%llx %u: insufficient priv "
 			 "from pid=%u tgid=%u uid=%u stats.gid=%u\n",
diff --git a/net/rmnet_data/rmnet_data_vnd.c b/net/rmnet_data/rmnet_data_vnd.c
index 4b0b2de1..f284f906 100644
--- a/net/rmnet_data/rmnet_data_vnd.c
+++ b/net/rmnet_data/rmnet_data_vnd.c
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ int rmnet_vnd_add_tc_flow(uint32_t id, uint32_t map_flow, uint32_t tc_flow)
 	list_add(&(itm->list), &(dev_conf->flow_head));
 	write_unlock_irqrestore(&dev_conf->flow_map_lock, flags);
 
-	LOGD("Created flow mapping [%s][0x%08X][0x%08X]@%p",
+	LOGD("Created flow mapping [%s][0x%08X][0x%08X]@%pK",
 	     dev->name, itm->map_flow_id, itm->tc_flow_id[0], itm);
 
 	return RMNET_CONFIG_OK;
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index f457cc2e..6f886c48 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -2449,31 +2449,31 @@ int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen,
 			break;
 	}
 
-out_put:
-	fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
-
 	if (err == 0)
-		return datagrams;
+		goto out_put;
 
-	if (datagrams != 0) {
+	if (datagrams == 0) {
+		datagrams = err;
+		goto out_put;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We may return less entries than requested (vlen) if the
+	 * sock is non block and there aren't enough datagrams...
+	 */
+	if (err != -EAGAIN) {
 		/*
-		 * We may return less entries than requested (vlen) if the
-		 * sock is non block and there aren't enough datagrams...
+		 * ... or  if recvmsg returns an error after we
+		 * received some datagrams, where we record the
+		 * error to return on the next call or if the
+		 * app asks about it using getsockopt(SO_ERROR).
 		 */
-		if (err != -EAGAIN) {
-			/*
-			 * ... or  if recvmsg returns an error after we
-			 * received some datagrams, where we record the
-			 * error to return on the next call or if the
-			 * app asks about it using getsockopt(SO_ERROR).
-			 */
-			sock->sk->sk_err = -err;
-		}
-
-		return datagrams;
+		sock->sk->sk_err = -err;
 	}
+out_put:
+	fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
 
-	return err;
+	return datagrams;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(recvmmsg, int, fd, struct mmsghdr __user *, mmsg,
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 67dc2175..3e2eec64 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1724,7 +1724,12 @@ restart_locked:
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+	/* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if
+	 * - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk
+	 * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
+	 */
+	if (other != sk &&
+	    unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
 		if (timeo) {
 			timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);